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We develop a model in which a worker's skills determine the worker's current wage and sector.
Both the market and the worker are initially uncertain about some of the worker's skills. Endogenous
wage changes and sector mobility occur as labor-market participants learn about these unobserved skills.
We show how the model can be estimated using non-linear instrumental-variables techniques.  We then
apply our methodology to study the wages and allocation of workers across occupations and across
industries.  For both occupations and industries, we find that high-wage sectors employ high-skill workers
and offer high returns to workers' skills.  Estimates of these sectoral wage differences that do not account
for sector-specific returns are therefore misleading.  We also suggest further applications of our theory
and methodology.
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  We analyze the theoretical and econometric implications of comparative advantage and 
learning for the wages and sector affiliations of individuals, and for changes in these variables 
over workers’ careers. After developing the theory and econometrics, we turn to two empirical 
applications of our methodology, concerning the wages and allocations of workers across 
occupations and across industries. 
  Our focus on comparative advantage is motivated by a large and established literature. 
Many have found that the average characteristics of individuals vary by sector.
1 Furthermore, 
several have found that the measured returns to individuals’ observable characteristics vary by 
sector.
2 Finally, Heckman and Scheinkman (1987) rejected the hypothesis that the returns to 
individuals’ time-invariant unmeasured characteristics are constant across sectors. 
  Our focus on learning is motivated by a smaller and more recent literature. While 
Jovanovic (1979), Harris and Holmstrom (1982), and others showed long ago that learning 
models could provide new interpretations for important features of the data (such as the return to 
seniority and the increase in the variance of wages with experience), recent work has built on 
these foundations to derive and test novel implications, many of which have survived 
confrontations with data.
3 
  Our theoretical model emphasizes the role of worker skills that cannot be measured by an 
econometrician. To clarify the exposition of the econometrics, we develop the theory in stages. 
                                                           
1  For example, Dickens and Katz (1987) found differences in average education levels by industry and 
Blackburn and Neumark (1992) found sorting by test scores across industries. 
2  For example, Mincer and Higuchi (1988) found differences in returns to tenure and experience across 
industries in Japan and the US and Freeman and Medoff (1984) found differences in returns to education and 
experience for union and non-union workers. 
3  For example, Farber and Gibbons (1996) derive and test the prediction that the residual from a regression 
of an individual’s score on an ability test (AFQT) on observable characteristics and the first wage should have 
increasing explanatory power for subsequent wages as experience increases. Continuing in this vein, Altonji and 
Pierret (2001) derive and test the prediction that the effect of observable characteristics (like education) should 
decrease with experience while the effect of initially unobservable characteristics like AFQT (not only the AFQT 
residual) should increase with experience. Chiappori, Salanié, and Valentin (1999) derive and test a new prediction 
from the Harris-Holmstrom model, that comparing two individuals in the same job in period 1 and the same (higher) 
job in period 3, future wage and promotion prospects are brighter for the individual who was promoted later (i.e., in 
period 3 rather than period 2). 
  1We begin with two models in which workers’ skills are equally valued in all sectors. In the first 
of these models, all labor-market participants have perfect information about workers’ skills; in 
the second, information is initially imperfect but output observations convey additional 
information over time and so endogenize wage changes. We then develop two other models in 
which different sectors place different values on workers’ skills and workers sort themselves into 
different sectors on the basis of comparative advantage. In the first of these latter two models, 
labor-market participants again have perfect information about workers’ skills; in the second, 
information is again imperfect, so learning endogenizes not only wage changes but now also 
sector mobility. 
  Our richest model, with comparative advantage and learning, resembles the learning and 
matching models of wages and turnover pioneered by Jovanovic (1979), Ross, Taubman, and 
Wachter (1981), and MacDonald (1982). In Jovanovic's model, a worker's performance is 
independent across jobs, whereas in our model (like Ross et. al. and MacDonald), a worker's 
performance in one job determines not only the expected value of staying in that job but also the 
expected value of moving to a given new job. We differ from Ross et. al. and MacDonald by 
introducing a one-dimensional notion of ability that determines a worker’s productivity in every 
sector, much as in Murphy (1986). The resulting model of learning and sorting is a natural 
generalization of the two-period, two-sector, two-type model in Gibbons and Katz (1992). 
  As is well known, in our simplest theoretical model (in which worker skills are equally 
valued in all sectors and there is no learning by labor-market participants), the returns to time-
varying worker characteristics can be estimated using first-differences to eliminate individual 
fixed effects that are unmeasured by the econometrician. Similarly, in this simplest model, first-
differences can be used to estimate sectoral wage differentials without bias from unmeasured 
fixed effects. Unfortunately, first-difference estimation is not appropriate for any of the three 
other theoretical models we develop. Simply put, in these models, a worker’s fixed ability does 
not translate into a fixed effect in a wage equation, so first-differencing the wage equation does 
  2not correct ability bias. The contribution of this paper is to move beyond merely warning of this 
problem (as in Gibbons and Katz, 1992, for example) to proposing a solution.  
  Our theoretical models rely heavily on the assumption of normality. Many models that 
rely on normality can be estimated by maximum likelihood or by two-step methods, but 
estimating our dynamic model of wage determination and sector affiliation would be 
computationally difficult because it entails more than two sectors and more than two periods. In 
addition, it is not necessary to estimate the full model when the parameters of interest are those 
that determine the returns to skills and wage differences across sectors. We therefore undertake 
the more modest task of estimating the wage equations in each sector.
4 
  We show that our richest theoretical model produces a random-coefficients econometric 
model in a panel-data setting, which can be estimated using a non-linear instrumental-variables 
technique. Even in this richest model, consistent estimates of the effects of both measured and 
unmeasured skills on wages require neither distributional assumptions nor standard exclusion 
restrictions. (That is, we use normal distributions to develop the full theory, but we do not need 
these assumptions to estimate the parameters of interest related to sectoral wage differentials and 
sector-specific returns to skills.) Instead, the estimation strategy utilizes natural restrictions 
available in panel data with three or more observations per person. Our econometric approach is 
similar to other panel-data models in which first-differenced estimates are inconsistent, such as 
Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988) and Lemieux (1998).  
  After developing the theory and econometrics, we implement two empirical 
investigations, concerning sorting and wage differentials across occupations and industries, 
using individual-level panel data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. Our richest 
theoretical model is consistent with several familiar facts about wage determination: a typical 
individual’s wage increases with experience, the variance of the wage distribution across 
                                                           
4  Other results exist on the identifiability of related models in the absence of normality. For example, 
Heckman and Honore (1990) show that the Roy model is identified with panel data and exogenous shifts in the 
price of skills over time. But Heckman and Honore focus on the estimation of a sequence of static models; they do 
not address learning and job mobility. 
  3individuals increases with experience, and the skewness of the wage distribution increases with 
experience.
5 But variants of Mincer’s (1974) theory can also explain these basic facts, so we 
focus on our model’s further predictions, concerning the returns to skills and the resulting 
allocation of workers across sectors. For both occupations and industries, we find important 
variation in sector-specific returns to observed and unobserved skills. Furthermore, in both cases, 
high-wage sectors employ high-skill workers and offer high returns to workers’ skills, so 
estimates of sectoral wage differences that do not account for sector-specific returns to skill and 
the sorting of workers across sectors on the basis of unmeasured skills are misleading and 
difficult to interpret. 
  Although our empirical work explores two standard definitions of sectors (namely, 
occupations and industries), other definitions are possible. For example, sectors could be jobs 
inside a firm (Gibbons and Waldman, 1999; Lluis, 2001), states or regions within a country 
(Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo, 1992), or entire countries (Borjas, 1987). In fact, the individuals in 
our model need not be workers. Instead, they could be firms, where what we call worker ability 
is reinterpreted as firm productivity, much as Jovanovic (1982) reinterpreted Jovanovic (1979).   
 
 
2.  Theory and Econometrics 
  The four theoretical models analyzed below are special cases of the following model. If 
worker i is employed in sector j at time t, the worker's output is 
 
(1) yijt = exp(Xit βj + ψijt), 
 
where Xit is a vector of human-capital and demographic variables measured by the 
econometrician and ψijt represents determinants of productivity that are not measured by the 
econometrician. The worker characteristics Xit and the slope vector βj are known by all labor-
                                                           
5   An illustrative discussion of these implications of the model and a comparison with alternative labor 
market models is presented in Neal and Rosen (2000). 
  4market participants at the beginning of period t; the realized output yijt is observed by all labor-
market participants at the end of period t. The error term ψijt has the components  
 
(2)  ψijt = Zi + bj (ηi + εijt ) + cj, 
 
where Zi denotes the portion of worker i’s productive ability that is equally valued in all sectors, 
ηi denotes the portion that is differentially valued across sectors, and εijt is a random error. The 
coefficients {bj, cj : j = 1,...,J} are fixed and known to all labor-market participants. The noise 
terms εijt are normal with zero mean and precision hε (i.e., variance σε
2 = 1/hε ) and are 
independent of each other and of all the other random variables in the model.  
  In developing the theory and econometrics, we treat Zi and ηi differently. We assume 
throughout that Zi is observed by all labor-market participants; this is the standard case of a fixed 
effect that the econometrician cannot observe but market participants can. For ηi, however, we 
consider two cases: perfect information (no learning by market participants, as with Zi) and 
imperfect information (learning). One could also imagine investigating learning about Zi. Farber 
and Gibbons (1996) study this problem in the absence of sector-specific returns to ability (i.e., 
bj=b and βj = β for every j, so that a worker's unmeasured ability is Zi + bηi and is equally valued 
in every sector), but the combined problem of learning about Zi and about ηi awaits future 
research. 
  In the imperfect-information case, all labor-market participants share symmetric but 
imperfect information about ηi. In particular, given their initial information (Zi and Xi1), all 
participants in the labor market share the prior belief that ηi is normal with mean m and precision 
h. Subsequent productivity observations, yijt , refine this belief. Information in the labor market 
therefore remains symmetric and improves over time. For simplicity, we assume that subsequent 
realizations of measured skills, Xit, are conditionally independent of ηi given Zi and Xi1. (This 
assumption is not only convenient but realistic, because the major time-varying element of Xit is 
experience.) Thus, market participants can compute 
  5 
(3) 
j
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which yields sit = ηi + εijt, a noisy signal about the worker's ability that is independent of the 
worker's sector during period t. We call sit the worker's normalized productivity observation for 
period t. Let si
t = (si1,..., sit) denote the history of the worker's normalized productivity 
observations through period t. Then (from Chapter 9 of DeGroot, 1970) the posterior distribution 
of ηi given history si
















and precision ht = h + thε. 
  To close the model, we assume that workers are risk-neutral and that there is no cost to 
firms or workers at the beginning or end of a job (i.e., no hiring, firing, or mobility costs), so we 
can restrict attention to single-period compensation contracts. For simplicity, we further restrict 
attention to contracts that specify the period's wage before the period's production occurs (as 
opposed to piece-rate contracts). Competition among firms causes each firm in a given sector to 
offer a given worker a wage equal to the expected value of the worker's output in that sector, 
given the worker's observed characteristics and history of previous output realizations. 
 
2.1  Sorting without Comparative Advantage 
  In this sub-section we ignore the possibility of comparative advantage by assuming that 
bj=b for every j, so that a worker's unmeasured ability is Zi + bηi and is equally valued in every 
sector. Continuing in this vein, we also assume in this section that βj = β for every j. But we 
allow the intercepts cj to vary by sector, in keeping with the possibility that measured sector 
premia may reflect true sector effects. Of course, all else constant, jobs in sectors with high 
  6values of cj may be more attractive (depending on the source of cj , such as rent-sharing versus 
compensating differentials). If some sectors are more attractive, issues such as queuing and 
rationing arise. Because our main interest is in the richer model with comparative advantage in 
Section 2.3, we do not formally address queuing or rationing here.  
  It is not controversial that workers' productive abilities are imprecisely measured in 
standard micro data sets. But if unmeasured skills are to explain estimated sector wage 
differentials then these skills must be non-randomly allocated across sectors. This, too, is 
plausible, for example because different sectors use different technologies that require workers' 
skills in different proportions. But if this unmeasured-skill explanation for measured sectoral 
wage differentials is correct, it suggests that the few skills that are measured in standard micro 
data sets (hereafter "measured skills") should be systematically related to the sector in which the 
worker is employed. We investigate this prediction about measured skills in our empirical work 
on occupations and industries in Sections 3 and 4. For now, however, we confine our attention to 
econometric approaches to estimating the role of unmeasured skills. 
  In the perfect-information case without comparative advantage, all firms know that the 
worker’s ability is Zi + bηi. As always, the wage offered to worker i by firms in sector j in period 
t is the worker's expected output in that sector, but the only uncertainty in this case is the error 
term bεijt in (2). Recall that if log θ is normally distributed with mean µ and variance σ
2 then 
E(θ) = exp{µ + (1/2)σ
2}. Therefore the log wage offered to worker i in sector j in period t is 
 




Turning to the imperfect-information case without comparative advantage, in each period, firms 
in sector j bid worker i's wage up to the worker’s expected output in that sector (conditional on 
the publicly observable information available at that date), so the log wage is 
 
(6) ln  wijt = Xitβ + Zi + bmi,t-1 + cj  + (1/2)b
2σt
2 , 
  7 
where mi,t-1 is shorthand for mt-1(si
t-1) and σt
2 = [h + thε]/(hε[h + (t-1)hε]). In both the perfect- and 
the imperfect-information cases, the worker's ability ηi is unmeasured by the econometrician (as 
is Zi); in the latter case, ηi is also unobserved by labor-market participants (unlike Zi). Note that, 
since t represents the number of years of experience in the model, the error component (1/2)b
2σt
2 
will be captured by a linear function in labor market experience that we include in all estimated 
models.   
 
2.2  Estimation without Comparative Advantage 
  In the absence of both learning and comparative advantage, the source of possible bias in 
conventional cross-section estimates of sectoral log wage differentials is the potential partial 
correlation between sector affiliation and unmeasured skills (Zi and ηi) conditional on measured 
skills (Xit). In this simplest case, the worker’s fixed ability (Zi + bηi) creates a worker fixed-
effect in the wage regression, which can be eliminated in standard fashion. For example, a first-
differenced regression eliminates the fixed effect Zi + bηi in (5). 
  Even without comparative advantage, however, learning implies that fixed ability is not a 
fixed effect in the earnings equation. The key property of our learning model is that Bayesian 
beliefs are a martingale. That is, the conditional expectation mt(si
t) in (4) obeys the law of motion 
 
(7) mit = mi,t-1 + ξit,  
 
where ξit is a noise term orthogonal to mi,t-1. In somewhat more intuitive terms, the market begins 
period t with the information contained in si
t-1 and then extracts new information about ηi from 
the output observation yijt (or, equivalently, sit). But the new information that can be extracted 
from yijt is precisely the part that could not be forecasted from si
t-1. Hence, the innovation ξit is 
orthogonal to the prior belief mi,t-1. 
  8  Farber and Gibbons (1996) explored some of the implications of this martingale property. 
But they focused on several specific predictions that can be derived regarding regressions in 
which the dependent variable is the level of earnings, not the log of earnings. In this paper, in 
contrast, we use the log of earnings as the dependent variable, so the specific Farber-Gibbons 
predictions do not hold, but the martingale property of the market's beliefs continues to create 
endogeneity problems, as follows.
6 
  Formally, a first-differenced regression eliminates Zi but not mi,t-1 from (6). Instead, first-
differencing (6) for a worker who switches from sector j to sector j' yields 
 




t-1)  ,   
 
where mi,t-1 - mi,t-2 = ξi,t-1. But ξi,t-1 may be correlated with the change in sector affiliation through 
whatever (unmodeled) process led unmeasured ability to be correlated with sector affiliation in 
the first place.7 Thus, with learning, first-differenced estimates of sectoral wage differentials are 
biased if the change in the residual is correlated with the change in sector affiliation. Fortunately, 
this endogeneity problem is simple to correct because the new information summarized in ξi,t-1 is 
not related to wage, skill, or sector information in period t - 1 or earlier. (See Section 2.4 for 
more discussion of this issue.) For example, equation (8) can be estimated by two-stage least 
squares using the interaction of the worker’s score on an ability test (taken before the worker 
entered the labor market) and the worker’s sector affiliation at t-1 as a valid instrumental 
variable for changes (between t - 1 and t) in sector affiliation.  
                                                           
6  Relative to Farber and Gibbons, we also use the more specific production function (1), the more specific 
error structure (2), and the more specific distributional assumptions given in the text below (2). We impose these 
more specific assumptions in order to explore several issues related to the returns to skills across sectors, which 
Farber and Gibbons could not address with their more general model. 
7  For example, suppose that there are only two levels of ability, high and low, but that sectors differ in the 
proportion of high-ability workers they employ. Consider a high-ability worker whose employment exogenously 
ends in sector j. Suppose that such a worker is equally likely to be re-employed in any of the economy’s jobs for 
high-ability workers. Then there is some probability that the worker’s new job is again in sector j, but if the worker 
changes sectors then it is likely that the new job is in a sector with a large number of high-ability jobs. In this case, 
positive information about a worker’s ability will tend to be associated with shifts to high-wage sectors (where high-
skill jobs are more plentiful), and the reverse for negative information. 
  9 
2.3  Sorting with Comparative Advantage  
  In this section we relax the assumption that a worker's ability is equally valued in every 
sector. By introducing comparative advantage, we endogenize sector affiliation. By subsequently 
introducing learning, we endogenize not only wage changes but also sector mobility. 
  To analyze comparative advantage, we now return to the production function specified in 
(1) and (2), where the slope coefficients βj in (1) and bj in (2) vary by sector. We index the J 
sectors so that bj strictly increases in j: sector j + 1 values the worker's ability ηi more than does 
sector j. In keeping with the notion that ability is productive, we assume that b1 > 0. Given a 
fixed Xit there exist critical values of ηi that determine the efficient assignment of workers to 
sectors. Denoting these critical values by {vj(Xit) : j = 0, 1,...,J}, the efficient assignment rule 
assigns worker ηi to sector j if and only if vj-1(Xit) < ηi < vj(Xit), where v0(Xit) = -∞, vn(Xit) = ∞, 
and vj(Xit) strictly increases in j. See Figure 1 for a graphical representation of this efficient 
assignment rule.  
  We again analyze first perfect and then imperfect information. In the perfect-information 
case, firms in sector j bid worker i's wage up to the expected output in that sector: 
 




analogous to (5) but with the sector-specific returns βj and bj. If the worker faces no mobility 
constraints, worker i will choose to work in sector j if vj-1(Xit ) < ηi < vj(Xit). Thus, taking the 
model literally, sector mobility in the perfect-information case is driven entirely by changes in 
Xitβj. One could envision exogenous shocks to sector demand that produce additional sector 
mobility in this model, but we will not formally model such shocks, for the same reason that we 
did not model queues or rationing above: our ultimate interest is in the model with comparative 
advantage and learning, which gives a coherent account of sectoral mobility without reference to 
queues, rationing, or sectoral shocks. Whatever the reason that worker i is employed in sector j 
  10in period t, in the perfect-information case with comparative advantage we assume that the 
worker's wage is given by (9). 
  In the imperfect-information case, we again assume that information in the labor market 
is symmetric but imperfect, as described above. As in the model of learning without comparative 
advantage, all participants in the labor market share the prior belief that ηi is normal with mean 
m and precision h, conditional on their initial information Zi and Xi1. Inferences from the 
productivity observations, yijt, are greatly simplified because the information content of an output 
observation is constant across sectors; that is, (2) involves bj(ηi + εijt) rather than bjηi + εijt. This 
functional form is what allows us to define the normalized productivity observation for worker i 
in period t, sit from (3), to be a noisy signal about the worker's ability that is independent of the 
worker's sector during period t. Relaxing this assumption about the functional form of (2) would 
complicate the analysis because workers' sector choices would then depend on the benefit from 
faster learning as well as on the benefit from increased expected output given current beliefs. 
Relaxing the assumption that all labor-market participants observe Zi (so that there could be 
learning about both Zi and ηi) would cause similar complications. Under our assumptions, the 
posterior distribution of ηi given the history si
t is normal with mean mit given by (4) and 
precision ht = h + thε, regardless of the worker’s history of sector affiliations. 
  In this fourth model, with learning and comparative advantage, we finally have an 
internally consistent account for sector affiliation, wages, sector mobility, and wage changes, as 
follows. In each period, firms in sector j bid a worker's wage up to the worker's expected output 
in that sector, conditional on the publicly observable information about the worker available at 
that date: 
 




analogous to (6) but with sector-specific returns βj and bj. The model also includes sector-
specific (experience) effects since the posterior variance σt
2, which declines with time (labor 
  11market experience), is interacted with bj
2.  The worker chooses to work in the sector offering the 
highest current wage. Thus, worker i chooses sector j in period t+1 if vj-1(Xit ) < mit < vj(Xit).  
  
2.4  Estimation with Comparative Advantage 
  We now develop a non-linear instrumental-variables procedure to estimate the 
parameters {βj, bj, cj; j = 1,..., J} in (9) and (10). This procedure does not rely on normality and 
can be implemented using standard computer packages. To discuss the estimation of the model, 
define the sector indicators Dijt where: 
 D ijt = 1 if person i is employed in sector j at time t, 
 D ijt = 0 otherwise. 
The wage equation (10) for each sector j can then be written as a single equation where 






t i j ijt
j
i j it ijt
j
j ijt it b D m b D Z X D c D w µ σ β ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ + + + + + = −
2 2
1 , ) ( ln 1/2 . 
 
Estimates of the sector slopes and intercepts {βj, cj; j = 1,..., J} obtained by estimating equation 
(11) with OLS are inconsistent. The problem is that expected ability influences sector affiliation, 
so mi,t-1 is correlated with the set of sector dummies {Dijt, j = 1,..., J}. 
  The endogeneity problem in equation (11) is different from the usual fixed-effect case for 
two reasons. First, as noted in Section 2.2, mi,t-1 is a martingale rather than a fixed effect. This 
martingale property does not depend on the normality assumptions in our theoretical model; all 
Bayesian beliefs are martingales. In the absence of comparative advantage, we could handle this 
martingale problem as described in Section 2.2. But, second, comparative advantage causes mi,t-1 
to be interacted with the set of sector dummies {Dijt, j = 1,..., J} in (11). 
  Other panel-data models in which first-differenced estimates are inconsistent have been 
considered in the literature. For example, Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988) discuss the 
  12estimation of models in which the fixed effect is interacted with year dummies. They show that 
consistent estimates can be obtained by quasi-differencing the equation of interest and then using 
appropriate instrumental-variables techniques. Similarly, Lemieux (1998) estimates a model in 
which the return to a time-invariant unobserved characteristic is different in the union and the 
nonunion sectors.  
  The estimation strategy we follow also relies on quasi-differencing combined with IV 
techniques. More precisely, we eliminate mi,t-1 by exploiting the dynamic structure of the 
problem, as follows. First, solving (11) for mi,t-1 yields:  
 
(12)  mi,t−1 =
ln wit − Dijtc j −
j
∑ DijtXitβ j −
j










The lagged version of equation (12) yields an expression for mi,t-2. Substituting this expression 
for mi,t-2 into the law of motion mi,t-1 = mi,t-2 + ξi,t-1 gives a new expression for mi,t-1, which can be 
substituted into the wage equation (11) to yield: 
 
(13) ln wit = Dijtcj +
j











∑ eit , 
where 
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  Equation (13) is a non-linear wage equation from which mi,t-1 has been eliminated. Non-
linear least-square estimates of the sector slopes and intercepts {βj, bj, cj; j = 1,..., J} are 
nevertheless inconsistent for two reasons. First, the lagged version of equation (11) shows that ln 
wi,t-1 is correlated with µi,t-1 by construction (but not with ξi,t-1, which is unknown at the moment 
  13wi,t-1 is decided). Second, the sector dummies Dijt are correlated with νi,t-1 because expected 
ability influences sector affiliation. Fortunately, both of these problems can be handled by 
finding appropriate instruments for ln wi,t-1 and the set of sector dummies {Dijt, j = 1,..., J}. Such 
instrumental variables must of course be independent of the error term eit in equation (13). 
  The most obvious candidate instrumental variables are wage, skill, or sector information 
from period t-1 or earlier, as well as interactions of these variables. Since the evolution of wages 
and sector affiliation over time is driven by the evolution of mit, these wage, skill, and sector 
histories should help predict mi,t-1 and thus ln wi,t-1 and {Dijt, j = 1,..., J}.  We chose the 
interaction between sector affiliation at time t-1 and t-2, {Dij,t-1, j = 1,..., J} and {Dij,t-2, j = 1,..., 
J}, as our main instrumental variables.  These interactions between sector affiliation at t-1 and t-
2 are uncorrelated with the error term eit in equation (13) given the model’s assumption that 
sector affiliation is determined only by perceptions about the sector-sensitive components of 
ability (Xit and ηi) and is independent of any part of ability that is not differentially valued across 
sectors (Zi).  In Appendix B we discuss in more detail why the model suggests using these 
variables as instruments.  We also show evidence of their predictive power.  For efficiency 
reasons discussed below, we also include a set of interactions of sector affiliation at time t-2 with 
the explanatory variables Xit (as summarized by a skill index and year of experience) in the 
instrument set.
8 
  We estimate the parameters in equation (13) using non-linear instrumental-variables 
(NLIV) techniques. Consider e, a vector in which all the individual error terms eit are stacked, 
and V, a matrix in which the individual instrument vector vit (e.g., sector histories) are stacked. 
Since the error terms e should be uncorrelated with the instruments V, the orthogonality 
condition (1/N)e'V = 0 should hold. The NLIV method consists of setting the sample analogs of 
                                                           
8   Since both the terms Xitβj and (1/2)bj
2σt
2 are interacted with sector affiliation, which is endogenous, it is 
natural to include some instruments for sector affiliation interacted with those terms in the instrument set.  In the 
estimation we replace Xitβj by a skill index discussed below and use experience to proxy for σt
2.  This leads to 
adding interactions between the second lag of sector affiliation (the instruments for sector affiliation) and the skill 
index and experience to the main set of instruments (interactions between sector affiliation at t-1 and t-2).  
  14(1/N)e'V as close as possible to zero by finding the values of the parameters cj, bj, and βj (for j = 
1,..., J) that minimize the quadratic form 
 
(14)  S = (1/N) (e'V)M(e'V), 
  
where M is a weighting matrix.  Note that the parameters {βj, bj, cj; j = 1,..., J} are implicitly 
included in S because the elements eit of e are computed as the difference between ln wit and the 
explanatory factors on the right-hand-side of equation (13). Under the assumption that eit is 
homoskedastic and uncorrelated, it is well known that the most efficient estimate is obtained by 
using the inverse of the variance of e'V as weighting matrix, M=(V'V)
-1.  However, equation (13) 
shows that eit is a relatively complex function of the sector dummies.  So eit will be 
heteroskedatic even if the “structural” error terms ξit and µit are homoskedastic.   
  To allow for heteroskedasticity, we use a standard GMM two-step procedure in which the 
parameters are first estimated using M=(V'V)
-1.  These consistent but inefficient parameters are 
used to compute a heteroskedasticity-robust variance matrix Σ of e'V.  Efficient GMM estimates 
are then obtained using M=Σ
-1.  Furthermore, it is easily shown (Hansen, 1982) that N times the 
minimized value of S follows a χ
2 distribution with q degrees of freedom, where q is the number 
of overidentifiying restrictions (the difference between the number of instruments and the 
number of parameters).   In complicated non-linear models like ours, however, this 
overidentification test is better thought as an omnibus specification test than as a standard test of 
the validity of instruments commonly performed for linear models.  We discuss in more detail in 
Appendix B why these tests should be interpreted with care.  
  In the linear case where eit is homoskedastic and uncorrelated, NLIV is just the well-
known two-stage least-squares estimator.  One difficulty with NLIV is that since we project a 
non-linear function of the model variables and of the parameters (e) into a linear set of 
instruments (V), the instruments must be chosen in a way that predicts sufficiently well the 
  15explanatory righthand side of equation (13).
9  In addition to the sector histories discussed above, 
we thus include as instruments a set of interactions between the explanatory variables Xit (as 
summarized by a skill index and years of experience) and the period t - 2 dummies for sector 
affiliation {Dij,t-2, j = 1,..., J}.  
  In the perfect-information case, where unmeasured ability ηi is observed by labor market 
participants, the quasi-differenced equation (13) remains the same except that the innovation 
term ξi,t-1 drops from the error term eit. The remaining endogeneity problem is due to the 
correlation between ln wi,t-1 and the error component µi,t-1. In this case, we simply use the full set 
of interactions between the sector dummies at time t and t - 1 as instruments for ln wi,t-1.10  




  The data set used in this paper is the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, or NLSY. 
Individuals in the NLSY were between the ages of fourteen and twenty-one on January 1, 1979. 
We use up to seventeen yearly observations per worker (from 1979 to 1996).
11 One advantage of 
the NLSY is that it allows us to follow workers from the time they make their first long-term 
transition to the labor force.  
  We use the same sample-selection criteria as those used by Farber and Gibbons (1996). 
We classify individuals as having made a long-term transition to the labor force when they spend 
at least three consecutive years primarily working, following a year spent primarily not working. 
Someone is classified as primarily working if she/he has worked at least half the weeks since the 
 
9   See Newey (1990) for more discussion and proposed (nonparametric) solutions to this problem.  Note that 
choosing the functional form or the number of instruments can also be problematic in the linear model (Donald and 
Newey, 1999).    
10  In the absence of learning, either the interactions between sector affiliation at time t and t-1 or at time t-1 
and t-2 can be used as instruments.  In practice, this choice has little impact on the results since both sets of 
instruments predict very well the wage (see Appendix B).  Since sector affiliation is exogenous in this model, we do 
not need to include the additional interaction terms between the skill index, experience, and sector affiliation at time 
t-2 discussed above.  Note that Lemieux (1998) uses an identical strategy to estimate union wage differentials when 
unmeasured ability is known to all labor-market participants but is differently rewarded in the union and non-union 
sectors: the interaction between the union status at time t and t - 1 is used as an instrument for the lagged wage.   
11  There was no interview in 1995. 
  16last interview and averaged at least thirty hours per week during the working weeks.   Note that 
the “last interview” does not necessarily refer to the previous calendar year if an individual had 
not been interviewed the year before. Self-employed workers are deleted, as are members of the 
NLSY military subsample.  Readers are referred to Appendix 1 in Farber and Gibbons (1996) for 
more details on the criteria used to construct our NLSY sample.  
  Farber and Gibbons used NLSY data from 1979 to 1991 interview years, whereas our 
data are through 1996. Except for the longer sampling frame, the only noteworthy difference 
between our sample and Farber and Gibbons’s has to do with union coverage in 1994. For some 
reason, the question on union coverage in the current or most recent job at interview time (job 
number 1 in the work history file) was not asked in that year. Although the error was caught and 
fixed during the field period, many respondents were simply not asked this question even though 
they should have been.  Consequently, the raw data shows a large number  “valid skips”.
12 We 
provide a correction of our own to partially fix this problem and recover quite a few of those 
missing observations. More precisely, if an individual in 1994 is working for the same employer 
as the one he worked for in the previous interview, we assign the value of the union coverage 
dummy for the previous interview year to the current one. If the individual interviewed in 1994 
has started working for a new employer since the last interview, we check to see whether she/he 
is still working for that employer in 1996. If so, we assign the value of the union coverage 
dummy for that year to the 1994 interview.     
  From this NLSY sample we focus on the subsample of observations at which the 
individual was working at the interview date for at least the previous three years. This sample 
restriction enables us to use the first and second lags of various variables in the estimation, as 
explained in Section 2.4. We exclude workers in agricultural jobs. Since we (later) divide 
manufacturing into durable and nondurable goods manufacturing, we also exclude a few workers 
who hold jobs in manufacturing industries that are hard to classify as producing durable as 
                                                           
12  Personal communication from Steve McClaskie of the Center for Human Resource Research. 
  17opposed to nondurable goods.
13 We are left with a sample of 35,438 observations on 5,904 
workers that satisfy these sample-selection criteria.  
  To summarize the relationship between the wage premia and observable skills, we 
construct a "skill index" for each worker. We first estimate a flexible log (hourly) wage equation 
using our sample.
14  The base explanatory variables used in the log wage equation are the AFQT 
score, years of education, education category dummies (dropout, high school graduates, some 
college, and college degree), (actual) experience, experience squared, dummy variables for race, 
gender, marital status, union status, and a set of dummies for year, industry, and occupation.  We 
also include sets of pairwise interactions between the education category dummies, gender, and 
race, as well as interactions between gender and experience, gender and marital status, and race 
and experience.  Detailed regression results are reported in Appendix Table A with and without 
the AFQT variable included. 
  We then use the estimated coefficients from that equation to predict the wage of each 
worker. The skill index is the predicted wage based solely on the education, experience, and 
AFQT score of the worker. That is, although characteristics such as occupation, industry, union 
status, and demographic characteristics are included in the initial wage equation, they are not 
used to construct the skill index for the worker. We normalize the skill index to have zero mean.  
 
 
4.  Wages and Returns to Skills Across Occupations 
  We believe that the concepts of sorting and comparative advantage are likely to play a 
more important role for occupations than for industries, so we first estimate our models for 
occupations.  As we mention in Section 5, other factors such as compensating wage differences 
and rent-sharing may mask the importance of comparative advantage in the case of industries.  
Furthermore, our one-factor model is well suited to cases where there is a natural ordering of 
                                                           
13  These industries are: stone, clay, and glass; tobacco manufacturing; leather and leather products; and not 
specified manufacturing. Workers in these industries represent less than one percent of the full sample. 
14   The wage variable in all estimated models is the hourly wage on the current job at the time of the survey. 
  18sectors from least skill-sensitive to most skill-sensitive.  We believe this ordering is more likely 
apply to occupations (e.g. going from operatives to craft workers to managers) than industries. 
 
4.1  Occupational Wage Premia without Comparative Advantage  
  Throughout the paper, we divide workers into seven conventional occupation 
aggregates.15 In Table 1 we report the raw occupation log wage differentials (relative to the 
service occupation) and the average values of measured skills (education and experience) and 
other measured characteristics (race, sex, and marital status) by occupation. As is well known, 
there are large differences across occupations in mean wages and in mean values for education 
and other characteristics.  There is also a strong link between these two variables: the correlation 
between the raw wage premium and the mean level of education is 0.81 (bottom row of Table 1). 
  The mean skill index for each occupation is reported in Column 7. In keeping with the 
positive correlation between the wage premium and mean education, we find that the correlation 
between the raw wage premium and the mean skill index is 0.96. But the cross-occupation 
variation in mean log wages in Column 1 (standard deviation of 0.181) is almost twice as large 
as cross-occupation variation in the skill index in Column 7 (standard deviation of 0.099), 
suggesting that there may be more to the story than just observable skills. In this spirit, Column 1 
of Table 2 reports an OLS regression of the log wage on the skill index and six occupation 
dummies (operatives and laborers are the base occupation).  All the models reported in Table 2 
also include controls for industry affiliation (nine dummy variables), gender, race, marital status, 
union status, and a full set of year dummies.   
  The skill index is highly significant and has a coefficient of one (by construction), but the 
occupation coefficients remain highly significant, although smaller than the raw wage 
differentials reported in Table 1. Of course, such a regression merely replicates the common 
                                                           
15  Using a more detailed classification does not alter our basic findings and comes at the cost of less precise 
estimates of the occupation effects. Precision is an issue for the some of the non-linear instrumental variables 
models presented below. 
  19finding that the occupation coefficients are significant even after controlling for measured 
characteristics. We report it as our point of departure. 
  In this OLS model, the standard deviation of the estimated occupational wage premia is 
.086.  Column 2 reports first-differenced estimates of these premia; their standard deviation falls 
to .021. Of course, these first-differenced estimates might be attenuated by false transitions. One 
approach to the false-transitions problem is to estimate a fixed-effect regression rather than a 
first-differenced regression.
16 We present fixed-effect estimates in Column 3; the occupational 
wage premia have a standard deviation of .032. Another approach to the false-transitions 
problem is to re-compute the first-differenced estimates on the sub-sample of observations in 
which the worker reports taking a new job (with a new employer). The resulting wage premia (in 
Column 4) have a standard deviation of .036. In sum, the estimates in Columns 3 and 4 are 
consistent with the view that more than half of the variation in occupational wage premia (after 
controlling for measurable skills) may be due to unmeasured ability bias, even in our simplest 
model without comparative advantage or learning. 
  In Columns 5 and 6 of Table 2 we explore the possibility of further bias associated with 
learning (but not comparative advantage). As described at the end of Section 2.2, the problem is 
that learning about ability may be correlated with the change in sector affiliation (such as where 
job loss is exogenous but re-employment is not). As suggested in Section 2.2, we can use wage, 
skill, and sector information from period t-1 or earlier to instrument for the change in sector 
affiliation between periods t-1 and t. In Columns 5 and 6 we use as instruments the full set of 
interactions between occupation dummies at times t-1 and t-2.  For the full sample (Column 5), 
none of the individual occupation effects is significant. Furthermore, the standard deviation of 
the estimated occupation effects is quite small (.009), and we cannot reject that these premia are 
all zero (p-value of .46).  The results for the sub-sample of new jobs (Column 6) are relatively 
                                                           
16  Fixed-effect estimates use information from both first differences and longer differences and so are less 
affected by measurement error than first-difference estimates are (Griliches and Hausman, 1986). 
  20similar.  Now some of the estimated occupation effects are individually significant, but we still 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that all premia are jointly equal to zero (p-value of 0.12). 
  Note that the estimates of the model for the sample of new jobs are much less precise 
than when all observations are being used.  As we will see in the next Section, limiting the 
analysis to new jobs appears to be a much more efficient way of eliminating false transitions in 
the case of industries than occupations.  The problem is that people can clearly change 
occupation by being promoted or re-assigned to a different task while staying with the same 
employer.  We lose these legitimate changes when we focus on new jobs only.  By contrast, it is 
much more difficult for an employee to change industry while staying with the same employer.  
This means we should lose little legitimate information by focusing on new jobs in the case of 
industries. 
  In sum, our results suggest that accounting for both unmeasured ability and learning 
eliminates most of the occupational wage premia.  The results in Columns 2-4 indicate that 
controlling for measured and unmeasured skills explains over 80 percent of the raw standard 
deviation of wages across occupations (0.181).  The remaining premia are no longer significant 
when learning is accounted for in Columns 5 and 6, though these results are less precise than in 
the more standard models of Columns 1 to 4.  
 
4.2  Occupational Wage Premia and Occupational Skill Premia  
  Our exploration of occupation wage premia without comparative advantage strongly 
suggests that learning combined with the sorting of both measured and unmeasured skills 
accounts for the bulk of occupational wage premia.  In this section we explore the sources of this 
sorting by adding comparative advantage to the analysis.  We indeed find important differences 
in the returns to measured and unmeasured skills across occupations. This finding suggests 
caution in interpreting the standard occupational wage premia reported in Table 2 (and elsewhere 
in the literature). In addition, as we describe below, such occupation-specific returns to skill 
make estimated occupational wage premia difficult to interpret, even after controlling for 
  21differences in returns to skills across sectors. As a result, we now shift our focus to these 
differential returns to skill. In particular, we investigate whether high-skill workers are 
concentrated in high-return occupations, as our theory suggests. 
  Table 3 extends our analysis of occupational wage premia in Table 2 by reporting not 
only these premia but also occupation-specific returns to skills.  All models reported in Table 3 
also include the same set of additional controls (gender, race, year dummies, etc.) as in Table 2.  
Column 1 of Table 3 reports OLS estimates of the wage premia, while Column 2 reports the 
occupation-specific returns to observable skill.  Most of the estimated returns to skill are quite 
plausible.  For example, all occupations but the clerical occupations have a significantly larger 
return to skill than operatives and laborers.  Managers and sales occupations have the largest 
returns to skill, although the returns for professionals may be a bit smaller than expected.  
  In spite of these significant differences in occupation-specific returns to observable skills 
(p-value of .00 on the joint test of equality of returns), the associated occupational wage premia 
are quite similar to those from Column 1 of Table 2 (which did not allow for occupation-specific 
returns to skill). For example, the standard deviation of the estimated occupational wage premia 
is .096 – slightly larger than the .086 in Column 1 of Table 2. But our analysis in Table 2 
suggested an important role for unmeasured skills, so we next investigate occupation-specific 
returns to unobservable skills. 
  The remaining models reported in Columns 3 through 6 of Table 3 allow for occupation-
specific returns to both measured and unmeasured skill. In all models, we include (but do not 
show in the Table) a set of interactions between occupation and experience to capture the term 
(1/2)bj
2σt
2 in equation (13).
17 We allow returns to measured and unmeasured skill to be different 
but proportional.  In terms of the parameters of the model, this means that βj=kbj for all 
                                                           
17   Strictly speaking, this term should appear in only the learning model.  We include it in all models with 
unmeasured skills for the sake of comparability across specifications. 
  22occupations j, where k is a proportionality parameter.  As we report in the tables, proportionality 
can never be rejected, but k is typically statistically different from 1.
18   
  In the first model, reported in Columns 3 and 4, we analyze the model with comparative 
advantage but without learning, so the only endogenous variable is the lagged wage. In these 
models we use the full set of interactions between occupational affiliation at time t and t-1 as 
instrumental variables.  Relative to the OLS model of Columns 1 and 2, two features of the 
results in Columns 3 and 4 are striking.  First, none of the occupational wage premia remains 
significant once occupation-specific returns to unmeasured skills are accounted for in the 
estimation.  Recall that some of the premia were significant in the corresponding model for all 
workers without learning and without comparative advantage (first-difference estimates in 
Column 2 of Table 2).  This suggests that introducing comparative advantage can account for 
most of the remaining occupational wage premia, just as learning did in the last column of Table 
2.  Second, most of the occupation-specific returns to skill remain significantly different from 
one (the normalized return to skill for operatives and laborers).  Furthermore, the pattern of 
returns to skill across occupations now shows professionals, managers, and sales occupations 
with the highest returns.   
  The joint tests at the bottom of the Table confirm this pattern of results.  The null 
hypothesis that the occupational wage premia are all zero cannot be rejected (p-value of .44) 
while the null hypothesis that returns to skill are all the same can be rejected at standard 
significance levels (p-value of .036).   
  As a final step, Columns 5-6 report estimates of our richest theoretical model – equation 
(13), which allows for both comparative advantage and learning, so that both the lagged wage 
and the current occupation are endogenous. As discussed earlier, we use the full set of 
interactions between occupational affiliation at time t-1 and t-2 as instruments (plus interactions 
                                                           
18   We test for proportionality by estimating an unrestricted model with separate returns to measured and 
unmeasured skills and performing a non-linear Wald test (null hypothesis is that the ratio bj/βj is constant across 
occupations).  The p-value from this test is reported in the third row from the bottom of Table 3.    
  23between the skill index and occupational affiliation at time t-1 and t-2).  The results reported in 
Columns 5 and 6 are similar though slightly less precise than in the corresponding model without 
learning (Columns 3 and 4).  For instance, returns to skill among professional, managers and 
sales occupation are 20 to 25 percent larger than for operative and laborers.  The difference is not 
significant, however, except in the case of professionals.  Though the joint test of equality of the 
returns across occupations can no longer be rejected at the five percent level, it is still rejected at 
the 10 percent level (p-value of .085).  By contrast, as in the model without learning, none of the 
occupational wage premia are significant.  The joint test that all occupational premia are the 
same still cannot be rejected (p-value of .28). 
 
4.3 Interpretation 
  The evidence reported in Tables 1 through 3 strongly suggests that comparative 
advantage and sorting based on observable and unobservable skills play important roles in 
explaining raw occupational wage premia.  Table 1 shows strong and systematic sorting of 
highly-skilled into highly-paid occupations (correlation coefficient of .96).  Perhaps not 
surprisingly, Table 2 shows that controlling for measured and unmeasured skills in conventional 
ways (OLS and first-differences) successively reduces the standard deviation of occupational 
wage premia from 0.181 to 0.086 and to between 0.020 and 0.034 (depending on the estimator 
used to control for time-invariant unmeasured skills).  Remaining occupational wage premia are 
no longer significant once comparative advantage is explicitly accounted for by introducing 
occupation-specific returns to measured and unmeasured skills (Columns 3-4 of Table 3).  The 
pattern of occupation-specific returns to skill is strongly consistent with measured skill sorting 
across occupations.  For example, professionals who are the most skilled occupation (Table 1) 
also exhibit the largest return to skill (Column 4 of Table 3).   
  Interestingly, professionals also have the highest return to skill when learning is 
introduced in the model of Columns 5 and 6.  More generally, the correlation between average 
measured skills and returns to skill is 0.76 and 0.65 in the models with and without learning, 
  24respectively.  Note that introducing learning does not change the results substantially once 
comparative advantage is properly accounted for in Table 3.  One possible explanation for this 
finding is that though learning about ability may be quite important in the first few years in the 
labor market, it may not be as important further into workers’ careers (Neal 1999).  This may 
explain why learning plays a limited role in our NLSY sample where we have up to 15 years of 
labor market observations per worker. 
  As discussed earlier, introducing learning has more impact on the estimated occupation 
wage premia when comparative advantage is not properly accounted for (Table 2).  We suspect 
that since models without comparative advantage are misspecified, instrumenting for 
occupational affiliation as we do in the model with learning may help correct for some the biases 
induced by the failure to control for comparative advantage.
19   
 
 
5.  Wages and Returns to Skills Across Industries 
  A substantial literature has established that there are large and persistent wage 
differentials among industries, even after controlling for a wide variety of worker and job 
characteristics (Katz 1986; Dickens and Katz 1987; Krueger and Summers 1987, 1988). One 
possibility is that these inter-industry wage differentials largely reflect differences in workers’ 
productive abilities that are not captured by the variables available in standard individual-level 
data sets. An alternative explanation is that measured inter-industry wage differences are “true 
wage differentials” reflecting compensating differentials, non-competitive rent-sharing, or 
efficiency-wage considerations. Vigorous debate has centered on the extent to which industry 
wage differences reflect competitive factors such as unmeasured ability and compensating 
differentials (Murphy and Topel, 1987 and 1990) as opposed to labor-market rents, and on 
                                                           
19   For example, Wooldridge (1997) shows in a different context that using IV methods can sometimes yield a 
consistent estimate of the average treatment effect in a model with heterogeneous treatment effects (a random-
coefficients model).  The analogy with our case is that we also have a random-coefficients model since the “effect” 
of sector affiliation on wages depends systematically on skills in our model with comparative advantage. 
  25whether such measured wage differentials potentially may justify certain types of industrial or 
trade policies (Katz and Summers 1989; and Topel 1989).  
  In this context, our model with comparative advantage and learning can be viewed as a 
renewed attempt at “explaining” inter-industry wage differentials by the systematic allocation of 
unmeasured skills across industries.  For reasons mentioned earlier, we nonetheless expect 
comparative advantage to play less of a role in explaining sectoral wage differences across 
industries than across occupations. 
 
5.1  Industry Wage Premia without Comparative Advantage  
  We divide workers into ten conventional industry aggregates.20 In Table 4 we report the 
raw industry log wage differentials (relative to the retail trade industry) and the average values of 
measured skills (education and experience) and other measured characteristics (race, sex, and 
marital status) by industry. Like others, we find large differences across industries in mean 
wages and in mean values for education and other characteristics. Like Dickens and Katz (1987), 
we find substantial correlation between these raw wage premia and these mean characteristics. 
For example, the correlation between the wage premium and the mean level of education is .49. 
To move beyond individual skill measures such as education, we use the same skill index as in 
the previous section. The mean skill index for each industry is reported in the final column of 
Table 4. The correlation between the wage premium and the mean skill index is .85.  So, at first 
pass, sorting on observable skill appears to play a slightly smaller role in explaining inter-
industry wage differences than it did for occupations (when the correlation coefficient was .96).  
A related point is that that the cross-industry variation in mean log wages (.151) is much larger 
than the cross-industry variation in the skill index (.045), whereas the cross-occupation variation 
in the skill index (0.099) represented more than half the cross-occupation variation in wages 
(0.181). 
                                                           
20  Using a more detailed classification does not substantially alter our basic findings and comes at the cost of 
less precise estimates of the industry effects.  
  26  Table 5 reports the estimates of the models without comparative advantage.  All the 
models reported in Table 5 (and Table 6) also include controls for occupational affiliation (six 
dummy variables), gender, race, marital status, union status, and a full set of year dummies.  The 
results without learning reported in Columns 1 through 4 are relatively similar to those obtained 
by Krueger and Summers (1988) and others.  For instance, OLS estimates of the inter-industry 
wage differentials in Column 1 are large and significant, with a standard deviation of .105.  
Furthermore, more than half of the standard deviation of the OLS wage premia across industries 
remains when unmeasured skills are controlled for using fixed effects (.054 in Column 3) or first 
differences for new jobs (.059 in Column 4).  As discussed for occupations, the smaller standard 
deviation of industry wage premia obtained from first differences for all workers (.040) is likely 
due to false transitions among workers staying with the same employer.
21 
  Columns 5 and 6 report first-differenced IV models, to allow for the possibility of 
learning (but not comparative advantage).  The instrumental variables used in this model are the 
full set of interactions between industry affiliation at time t-1 and t-2.  The standard deviation of 
the estimated inter-industry wage differentials falls somewhat (from about .055 in Columns 3 
and 4 to about .042 in Columns 5 and 6).  Unlike the case of occupations, however, the null 
hypothesis of no industry wage premia is still strongly rejected (p-value of .0001), even in these 
IV estimates.   
  Other interesting patterns emerge from the comparison of results for industry and 
occupations.  For example, the standard deviation of raw wages differences is smaller for 
industries than for occupations (in Column 1 of Tables 1 and 4), but the standard deviation of the 
wage premia across sectors is substantially larger for industries than for occupation in the 
standard models without comparative advantage or learning (OLS, first-difference and fixed-
                                                           
21   Our results are also consistent with Krueger and Summers’ (1988) finding that first-differenced estimates 
of the industry wage effects can be significantly biased downwards because of misclassification errors in industry 
affiliation. Standard first-differenced estimates are misspecified when the whole sample is used but well-specified 
for job changers. Since misclassification errors in industry changes are much less likely to occur when a job change 
is observed than otherwise, we believe misclassification errors are the primary source of misspecification in the 
first-differenced estimates for the whole sample. 
  27effect estimates in Columns 1 through 4 of Tables 2 and 5).  This comparison strongly suggests 
that the sorting of measured and unmeasured skills across sectors plays more of a role in 
explaining the raw wage differentials across occupations than across industries. 
  A more subtle point is that controlling for skills has much more impact for some 
industries than others.  Take the case of two relatively “high-wage” industries, construction and 
professional and business services (PBS).  Despite high wages, construction has relatively low 
measured skills, while PBS has the highest measured skills of all industries (Table 4).  The raw 
log wage differences indicate that PBS pays 0.114 more than construction.  Just controlling for 
measured skills reverses this pattern.  The OLS estimates indicate that construction now pays 
.026 more than PBS (Column 1 of Table 5).  Controlling for unmeasured skills increases the gap 
in favor of construction to between 0.062 and 0.089, depending on the estimator being used 
(Columns 3 and 4).   
  This differential effect of controlling for skills (even without learning or comparative 
advantage) suggests that no single theory can likely explain the wage premia for all industries.  
In sectors like PBS, the systematic sorting of skills that follows from our model of comparative 
advantage likely accounts for a large share of the premium; in sectors like construction, 
compensating wage differences and unionization (rent-sharing) are more plausible explanations.  
We next explore this hypothesis formally by introducing comparative advantage in the estimated 
models. 
 
5.2  Industry Wage Premia and Industry Skill Premia  
  Table 6 extends our analysis by reporting not only the industry wage premia but also 
industry-specific returns to skills. Columns 1 and 2 report OLS estimates of the wage premia and 
returns to measurable skills, respectively.  As in the case of occupations, there is substantial 
heterogeneity in the returns to skill across industry.  In spite of this heterogeneity in industry-
specific returns to skills, controlling for this heterogeneity reduces the standard deviation of the 
estimated industry wage premia only slightly, from .105 (in Column 1 of Table 5) to .099. 
  28Roughly speaking, industries with high wage premia tend to exhibit high return to skill, though 
construction is an important exception.   
  A similar pattern holds when industry-specific returns to both measured and unmeasured 
skills are introduced in Columns 3 and 4.
22  Unlike the case of occupations, however, several of 
the industry wage premia remain positive and significant.  Interestingly, the joint test of equality 
of industry wage premia is strongly rejected while equality in industry-specific returns to skill 
cannot be rejected (p=.13).  This is the opposite of the case with occupations, where equality of 
the wage premia could not be rejected while equality in the occupation-specific returns to skill 
was rejected.  This finding is consistent with our interpretation that comparative advantage plays 
a more important role in explaining sectoral wage premia for occupations than for industries.  
But this is not to say that comparative advantage plays no role in wage and affiliation decisions 
across industries.  For example, comparing Column 3 to Column 1, the two “high wage” 
industries that experience the largest decrease in estimate wage premium are finance, insurance 
and real estate (FIRE) and professional and business services (PBS).  These two industries also 
happen to have the largest estimated returns to skill in Column 4 and relatively high skill levels 
(Table 4).   
  The models reported in the remaining columns of Table 6 are qualitatively similar to the 
model for all workers without comparative advantage of Columns 3 and 4.  In all cases, the joint 
test of equality of industry wage premia is strongly rejected while equality in industry-specific 
returns to skill cannot be rejected.   As in the case of occupations, accounting for learning has 
relatively little effect on the results. 
 
                                                           
22   As in the case of occupations, we constrain returns to measured and unmeasured skills to be proportional in 
all the models with industry-specific returns to skill.  The Table shows that proportionality is never rejected (p-
values ranging from .45 to .96) and that the proportionality parameter is always positive and well determined.  The 
instrumental variables are also selected in the same fashion as in the models for occupation.  In the models without 
learning, we use interactions between industry affiliation at time t and t-1 as instruments.  In the models with 
learning, the instruments used are the interactions between industry affiliation at time t-1 and t-2 and the interactions 
of industry affiliation at time t-2 with the skill index and experience.  
  295.3   Interpretation  
  The existing literature on inter-industry wage differentials suggests that neither a simple 
unmeasured-ability explanation (in which ability is equally valued in all industries and market 
perceptions of worker quality are time invariant) nor a pure rent-based explanation appears fully 
consistent with evidence from longitudinal analyses of the wage changes of industry switchers 
(Krueger and Summers, 1988) or the pre- and post-displacement wages of workers displaced by 
plant closings (Gibbons and Katz, 1992). These findings have motivated recent work that has 
focused on econometric approaches for estimating industry wage differentials while accounting 
for heterogeneous matches between workers (Neal 1995; Bils and McLaughlin 2001; Kim 1998). 
Our approach is also in this vein.
23 
  Our results reinforce the view that a single explanation does not fit all industries.  For 
instance, the industry wage premia in mining, manufacturing and construction remain large and 
statistically significant even in our richest model with comparative advantage and learning.  By 
contrast, introducing these two factors essentially eliminates the wage premia in industries such 




  We develop a model of wages and sector choices that generalizes the static model of 
sorting with perfect information to the case in which some skills are unobserved by both the 
market and the worker. Wage changes and sector mobility arise endogenously as the market and 
the incumbent firm learn about a worker’s skills. We show how this model can be estimated 
using non-linear instrumental-variables techniques.  
  We illustrate our theoretical and econometric approach by studying both occupations and 
industries. Broadly speaking, the results suggest that the measured occupational wage 
differentials in a cross-section regression are largely due to unmeasured and unobserved worker 
                                                           
23   A complementary approach focuses on correlations between ability and investments in sector-specific 
skills (Neal 1998). 
  30skills.  We find strong evidence that the sorting of skills into “high-wage” occupations is 
explained by high returns to skills in these occupations.  Although comparative advantage 
appears to play a fundamental role in occupational wage differences, the role of learning is more 
limited.  One possible explanation for this finding is that though learning may be quite important 
in the first few years in the labor market, it may not be as important later on.  
  The results for industries are mixed, which is consistent with the existing literature.  Our 
richest model with comparative advantage and learning explains relatively well the cross-
sectional premia in industries like finance, insurance and real estate and professional and 
business services.  More traditional explanations like compensating differences and rent-sharing 
seem to be better suited for industries such as mining, manufacturing, and construction. 
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  35TABLE 1 
Average Characteristics by Occupation
a 
                               Years of:        Fraction: 
                             ───────────── ────────────────────         Sample 
                  Raw Wage   Educ-  Exper- Female Non-  Married  Skill  Propor- 
                Differences
b ation  ience         white          Index   tion 
 
                    (1)      (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)     (7)      (8) 
 
1. Professionals    0.522    15.66  7.38   0.534  0.136  0.583   0.1479    0.212 
     
 
                       




3. Sales            0.388    14.38  7.49   0.400  0.118  0.550   0.0828    0.052 
   occupations  
        
                       
4. Clerical         0.116    13.17  7.27   0.786  0.233  0.503  -0.0907    0.203 
   occupations         
 
                       
5. Craft workers    0.290    12.17  7.96   0.077  0.157  0.499  -0.0358    0.118 
                       
 
                     
6. Operatives and   0.090    11.92  7.44   0.244  0.265  0.489  -0.0979    0.171 
   laborers        
 
                       
7. Service          0.000    12.73  7.10   0.532  0.310  0.424  -0.0989    0.108 
   Occupations         
 
 
Standard deviation  0.181     1.26  0.39   0.210  0.069  0.050   0.099 
(across occupations) 
 
Correlation with    1.00      0.81  0.53  -0.12  -0.94   0.93    0.96  
raw wage diff. 
 
  a. Based on a sample of 35,438 observations for 5,904 workers. See text 
for more details. 
  b. Mean log wage in the industry relative to service occupations (mean 
log wage in service occupations is 1.431). 
  36TABLE 2 
Estimates of Occupation Wage Differentials Without Comparative Advantage
a 
              No Learning                  Learning 
                           ──────────────────────────────────  ──────────────── 
Estimation Method:          OLS      FD       FE       FD       FDIV
b    FDIV
b 
 
Sample:                     All      All      All      New      All      New 
                                                       Jobs              Jobs 
                            (1)      (2)      (3)      (4)      (5)      (6) 
Occupation Effects: 
1. Professionals           0.208*   0.042*   0.043*   0.095*   0.019    0.002 
                          (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.016)  (0.014)  (0.030) 
 
2. Managers                0.213*   0.022*   0.049*   0.052*  -0.001    0.048 
                          (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.025) 
 
3. Sales occupations       0.191*   0.006    0.018    0.044*  -0.012    0.054 
                          (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.031) 
 
4. Clerical                0.044*  -0.003   -0.018*   0.010    0.007    0.050* 
   occupations            (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.025) 
 
5. Craft workers           0.144*   0.038*   0.039*   0.085*   0.010    0.041* 
                          (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.013)  (0.010)  (0.021) 
 
6. Service occupations     0.021*  -0.019*  -0.045*  -0.000    0.010    0.023 
                          (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.023) 
 
7. Operatives and          0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000      
   Laborers   
Skill Index                0.999*   0.811*   1.185*   0.764*   0.598*   0.804* 
                          (0.011)  (0.050)  (0.046)  (0.107)  (0.037)  (0.108) 
 
R-square                   0.418    0.035    0.789    0.070    0.031   0.061 
                                                                 
Observations               35438    35438    35438     9198    35438    9198 
                                                            
Overidentification Test    ---      ---      ---       ---     .0001   .0001 
(p-value) 
Test of equality of       .0000     .0001    .0001    .0001    .4563   .1165  
Occup. Effects (p-value) 
Standard deviation         0.086    0.021    0.032    0.036    0.009    0.021 
of occup. effects 
Adjusted std. deviation
c   0.086    0.020    0.032    0.034     ---      ---  
 
  a: Standard errors are in parentheses. "*" indicates that the estimated 
coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 95 percent confidence 
level. All specifications also include controls for gender, race, marital 
status, year effects, industry (9 dummies), and a dummy for collective 
bargaining coverage. 
  b: Instrumental variables (for changes in occupation) are the full set of 
interactions between the occupation dummies at time t-1 and t-2. 
  c: The adjusted standard deviation is the actual standard deviation of 
the estimated occupation effects corrected for the sampling variation in these 
estimates. 
  37TABLE 3 
Estimates of Occupation Wage Differentials With Comparative Advantage
a 
                                  No Learning                   Learning 
                          ──────────────────────────────────    ──────────────── 
Estimation Method:             OLS                NLIV                 NLIV       
Sample:                        All                All                  All        
                          ───────────────   ───────────────      ───────────────  
Occupation effects:        Main Interacted
b  Main Interacted
b     Main  Interacted
b 
         (1)     (2)       (3)     (4)          (5)     (6)      
 
1. Professionals           0.263*  1.120*    0.069   1.271*       0.029   1.259*  
                          (0.008) (0.034)   (0.034) (0.086)      (0.049) (0.116)  
 
2. Managers                0.233*  1.332*    0.046   1.201*       0.032   1.196   
                          (0.008) (0.036)   (0.034) (0.077)      (0.049) (0.110)  
 
3. Sales occupations       0.199*  1.476*    0.054   1.218*       0.087   1.224   
                          (0.011) (0.047)   (0.038) (0.083)      (0.061) (0.128)  
 
4. Clerical                0.066*  1.027     0.033   1.162*       0.004   1.099   
   occupations            (0.008) (0.036)   (0.031) (0.073)      (0.044) (0.097)  
 
5. Craft workers           0.168*  1.138*    0.040   1.023       -0.024   0.971   
                          (0.008) (0.044)   (0.026) (0.065)      (0.036) (0.086)  
 
6. Service occupations    -0.037*  1.107*    0.047   1.127        0.088   1.204   
                          (0.009) (0.042)   (0.035) (0.076)      (0.060) (0.133)  
 
7. Operatives and          0.000   1.000     0.000   1.000        0.000   1.000   
   Laborers                        
Proportionality factor
b          ---            0.8652*               0.7847* 




c           ---                 w1                  w1,D0      
Instrumental Variables
c         ---               D0*D1           D1*D2,SK*D2,E*D2  
Observations                   35438              35438                35438    
 
Overidentification test         ---               .0000                .0000    
(p-value)                         
 
Test of equality of            .0000              .4372                .2807   
Occupation Effects (p-value)  
 
Test of equality of            .0000              .0357                .0852   
Interaction slopes (p-value) 
 
Test of proportionality
b         ---              .1391                .5403   
(p-value) 
 
Standard deviation             0.096              0.020                0.040   
of occupation effects         
 
Adjusted std. Deviation
d       0.095               ---                  ---     
  38Notes to Table 3 
 
  a: Standard errors are in parentheses.  In the case of main effects, "*" indicates 
that the estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 95 percent 
confidence level.  In the case of interactions, "*" indicates that the estimated 
coefficient is significantly different from one at the 95 percent confidence level. All 
specifications also include controls for gender, race, marital status, year effects, 
industry (9 dummies), collective bargaining coverage, and (except in columns 1-2) 
occupation-specific experience effects. 
  b: In columns 1-2, the interaction terms indicate the effect of measured skills in 
the occupation relative to operatives and laborers (effect normalized to 1 in service 
occupations). In columns 3-6, the interaction terms indicate the effect of both measured 
and unmeasured skills in the occupation, again relative to operatives and laborers, but 
these occupation-specific slopes for measured and unmeasured skills are constrained to 
have the same proportionality factor across all occupations.  The estimated 
proportionality factor is reported at the bottom of the first panel; the test of the 
proportionality restriction is reported in the second panel.     
  c: In the endogenous variables, w1 stands for the lagged wage and D0 stands for 
contemporaneous values of the occupation dummies {Dijt, j=1,..,6}. In the instrumental 
variables, D1 and D2 stand for the first and second lag of occupations dummies, SK stands 
for the skill index, and E stands for experience. 
  d: The adjusted standard deviation is the actual standard deviation of the 
estimated occupation effects corrected for the sampling variation in these estimates. 
 
  39TABLE 4 
Average Characteristics by Industry
a 
                               Years of:        Fraction: 
                             ───────────── ────────────────────         Sample 
                  Raw Wage   Educ-  Exper- Female Non-  Married  Skill  Propor- 
                Differences
b ation  ience         white          Index   tion 
 
                    (1)      (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)     (7)      (8) 
 
1. Mining and       0.359    13.15  7.76   0.303  0.153  0.577   0.0106   0.142 
   Durable Manuf.    
 
2. Non-Durable      0.203    13.02  7.40   0.405  0.170  0.529  -0.0304   0.094 
   Manufacturing       
                     
3. Construction     0.283    11.99  8.06   0.085  0.166  0.486  -0.0457   0.062 
                      
                            
4. Transpo., Comm., 0.387    13.44  8.09   0.333  0.253  0.529   0.0261   0.066 
   Utilities           
                       
5. Finance. Insur., 0.348    14.10  7.43   0.659  0.172  0.505   0.0140   0.089 
   Real Estate         
                     
6. Profess. and     0.397    14.44  7.52   0.471  0.173  0.525   0.0628   0.084 
   Bus. Services   
                       
7. Personal        -0.032    12.63  7.26   0.400  0.236  0.436  -0.0685   0.041 
   Service             
                       
8. Wholesale Trade  0.222    14.39  7.34   0.659  0.219  0.545   0.0239   0.216 
                       
                               
9. Retail Trade     0.000    12.92  7.16   0.455  0.190  0.426  -0.0654   0.145 
 
 
10. Public Admin.   0.392    14.11  8.06   0.484  0.307  0.593   0.0494   0.062 
 
Standard deviation  0.151     0.78  0.34   0.160  0.047  0.051   0.045 
(across industries) 
 
Correlation with    1.00      0.49  0.70  -0.02   0.04   0.80    0.85  
raw wage diff. 
 
a. Based on a sample of 35,438 observations on 5,904 workers. See text 
for more details. 
b. Mean log wage in the industry relative to retail trade (mean log wage 
in the retail trade industry is 1.445). 
  40TABLE 5 
Estimates of Industry Wage Differentials Without Comparative Advantage
a 
              No Learning                  Learning 
                           ──────────────────────────────────  ──────────────── 
Estimation Method:          OLS      FD       FE       FD       FDIV
b    FDIV
b 
 
Sample:                     All      All      All    New Jobs   All    New Jobs 
                            (1)      (2)      (3)      (4)      (5)      (6) 
 
Industry Effects: 
1. Mining and Durable      0.280*   0.111*   0.148*   0.165*   0.065*   0.146* 
   Manufacturing          (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.023) 
 
2. Non-Durable             0.182*   0.075*   0.104*   0.108*   0.036*   0.071* 
   Manufacturing          (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.024) 
 
3. Construction            0.268*   0.134*   0.151*   0.173*   0.103*   0.144* 
                          (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.017)  (0.020)  (0.030) 
 
4. Transpo., Comm.,        0.275*   0.093*   0.131*   0.144*   0.055*   0.112* 
   Utilities              (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.017)  (0.021)  (0.029) 
 
5. Finance, Insurance,     0.248*   0.061*   0.110*   0.090*  -0.015    0.062* 
   Real Estate            (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.016)  (0.024)  (0.027) 
 
6. Prof. and Business      0.242*   0.064*   0.089*   0.084*  -0.003    0.049* 
   Services               (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.022) 
 
7. Personal Services       0.006   -0.012   -0.001   -0.001*  -0.017    0.014 
                          (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.026) 
 
8. Wholesale Trade         0.092*   0.054*   0.067*   0.079*   0.035*   0.066* 
                          (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.021) 
 
9. Retail Trade            0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000 
 
 
10. Public Admin.         0.244*   0.100*   0.149*   0.150*   0.029    0.081* 
                          (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.022)  (0.024)  (0.039) 
 
Skill Index                1.000*   0.811*   1.185*   0.749*   0.828*   0.767* 
                          (0.012)  (0.050)  (0.046)  (0.107)  (0.050)  (0.107) 
 
R-square                   0.418    0.036     ---     0.072     ---      --- 
 
Observations               35438    35438    35438    9198     35438    9198 
                                                            
Overidentification Test     ---      ---      ---      ---     .0001    .0003 
(p-value) 
 
Test of equality of        .0000    .0000    .0000    .0000    .0001    .0001  
Industry Effects (p-value) 
 
Standard deviation         0.105    0.040    0.054    0.059    0.037    0.046 
of industry effects 
 
Adjusted st. deviation
c    0.104    0.039    0.054    0.057    0.032    0.038 
  41Notes to Table 5 
 
  a: Standard errors are in parentheses. “*” indicates that the estimated coefficient 
is significantly different from zero at the 95 percent confidence level.  All 
specifications also include controls for gender, race, marital status, year effects, 
occupation (6 dummies), and collective bargaining coverage. 
b: Instrumental variables (for changes in industry affiliation) are the full set of 
interactions between the industry affiliation dummies at time t-1 and t-2. 
  c: The adjusted standard deviation is the actual standard deviation of the 
estimated industry effects corrected for the sampling variation in these estimates. 
 
 
  42TABLE 6 
Estimates of Inter-Industry Wage Differentials With Comparative Advantage
a 
                                             No Learning                                     Learning 
                           ──────────────────────────────────────────────────    ──────────────────────────────── 
Estimation Method:             OLS                NLIV            NLIV                NLIV              NLIV    
Sample:                        All                All           New Jobs              All             New Jobs 
                          ───────────────   ───────────────   ───────────────   ───────────────   ─────────────── 
Industry effects:         Main Interacted
b   Main Interacted
b   Main Interacted
b  Main Interacted
b  Main Interacted
b                    
         (1)     (2)       (3)     (4)       (5)     (6)       (7)     (8)       (9)    (10)        
 




    0.163
*
  1.124*    0.254
*
  1.138     0.144*  1.158     0.182*  0.978    
   Manufacturing         (0.008) (0.042)   (0.033) (0.062)   (0.051) (0.100)   (0.047) (0.100)   (0.060) (0.119) 
 
2. Non-Durable            0.187
*
  1.208*    0.093
*
  1.089     0.123*  1.114     0.112*  1.144     0.167*  1.282    
   Manufacturing         (0.009) (0.046)   (0.033) (0.060)   (0.051) (0.096)   (0.049) (0.100)   (0.089) (0.179) 
 
3. Construction           0.248*  0.823*    0.124*  1.005     0.173*  0.968     0.146*  1.115     0.169*  0.875    
                         (0.011) (0.054)   (0.040) (0.087)   (0.056) (0.133)   (0.065) (0.152)   (0.069) (0.147) 
 
4. Transpo., Comm.,       0.276*  0.969     0.114*  1.094     0.201*  1.182     0.053   1.275     0.190*  1.223    
   Utilities             (0.009) (0.048)   (0.041) (0.079)   (0.069) (0.135)   (0.063) (0.156)   (0.097) (0.201) 
 
5. Finance, Insurance,    0.237*  1.296*    0.037   1.212*    0.125*  1.362*   -0.040   1.156     0.029   1.241    
   Real Estate           (0.009) (0.049)   (0.040) (0.081)   (0.061) (0.131)   (0.052) (0.137)   (0.072) (0.181) 
 
6. Prof. and Business     0.224*  1.341*    0.052   1.176*    0.092   1.223*    0.028   1.132     0.084   1.098    
   Services              (0.009) (0.049)   (0.036) (0.070)   (0.052) (0.108)   (0.046) (0.105)   (0.062) (0.133) 
 
7. Personal Services     -0.023   0.625*   -0.050   0.970    -0.047   0.939     0.066   1.232     0.112   1.167    
                         (0.012) (0.056)   (0.054) (0.123)   (0.078) (0.192)   (0.105) (0.232)   (0.145) (0.311) 
 
8. Wholesale Trade        0.102*  0.877*    0.069   1.148*    0.109*  1.165     0.095   1.248*    0.180*  1.219    
                         (0.007) (0.032)   (0.033) (0.069)   (0.051) (0.108)   (0.051) (0.118)   (0.080) (0.166) 
 
  439. Retail Trade           0.000   1.000     0.000   1.000     0.000   1.000     0.000   1.000     0.000   1.000    
                           ---     ---       ---     ---       ---     ---       ---     ---       ---     --- 
 
10. Public                0.251*  0.936     0.119*  1.155
*
    0.183*  1.233     0.099   1.300     0.039   1.119    
    Administration       (0.010) (0.047)   (0.036) (0.078)   (0.064) (0.162)   (0.061) (0.176)   (0.077) (0.195) 
 
Proportionality
b               ---              0.987
*
            0.724
*
            0.860
*
            0.671
* 
Parameter                                      (0.063)           (0.103)           (0.077)           (0.111) 
 
Endogenous Variables           ---               w1                w1                w1,D0             w1,D0       
 
Instrumental Variables
c        ---               D0*D1             D0*D1       D1*D2,SK*D2,E*D2  D1*D2,SK*D2,E*D2                     
 
Observations                   35438             35428              9198             35438              9198 
                                                            
Overidentification test         ---              .0001             .0002             .0000             .0169 
(p-value)                         
 
Test of equality of            .0000             .0000             .0000             .0018             .0259  
Industry Effects (p-value)  
 
Test of equality of            .0000             .1331             .2473             .6980             .1996 
Industry Slopes (p-value) 
 
Standard deviation             0.099             0.061             0.086             0.058             0.038 
of industry effects         
 
Adjusted st. deviation
d        0.098             0.048             0.065              ---               --- 
 
Test of proportionality
b         ---              .9645             .4487             .4649             .5597 
(p-value) 
 
  a: In the case of main effects, “*” indicates that the estimated coefficient is significantly different 
from zero at the 95 percent confidence level.  In the case of interactions, “*” indicates that the estimated 
coefficient is significantly different from one at the 95 percent confidence level.  All specifications also 
include controls for gender, race, marital status, year effects, occupation (6 dummies), collective bargaining 
coverage, and industry-specific experience effects (except in the model of columns 1-2). 
  b: In columns 1-2, the interaction terms indicate the effect of measured skills in the industry relative to 
retail trade (effect normalized to 1 in this industry). In columns 3-10, the interaction terms indicate the effect 
of both measured and unmeasured skills in the industry, again relative to retail trade, but these industry-
specific slopes for measured and unmeasured skills are constrained to be proportional across all industries.  The 
estimated constant of proportionality between measured and unmeasured skills is reported at the bottom of the 
first panel; the test of the proportionality restriction is reported in the second panel.     
  44c: In the endogenous variables, w1 stands for the lagged wage and D0 stands for contemporaneous values of 
the occupation dummies {Dijt, j=1,..,6}. In the instrumental variables, D1 and D2 stand for the first and second 
lag of occupations dummies, SK stands for the skill index, and E stands for experience. 
d. The adjusted standard deviation is the actual standard deviation of the estimated industry effects 
corrected for the sampling variation in these estimates. 
 
  45Appendix Table A 
Log Wage Equations estimated to construct the skill index 
                    (1)             (2) 
 
Variables used to construct the skill index: 
 
AFQT                ---            0.272 
                                  (0.010) 
Years of educ      0.038           0.028 
                  (0.003)         (0.003) 
Educ. Categ. 
 HS dropout       -0.126          -0.046 
                  (0.028)         (0.028) 
 HS grad          -0.140          -0.095 
                  (0.018)         (0.018) 
 Some coll.       -0.138          -0.124 
                  (0.017)         (0.017) 
Experience         0.050           0.047 
                  (0.004)         (0.003) 
Exp. squared      -0.054          -0.058 
(/100)            (0.018)         (0.018) 
 
Other control variables: 
 
Female            -0.100          -0.090 
                  (0.012)         (0.012) 
Married            0.083)          0.079 
                  (0.006)         (0.005) 
Non-white         -0.071          -0.008 
                  (0.017)         (0.017) 
Union              0.168           0.176 
(0.005)         (0.005) 
Year dummies        yes             yes 
Industry dummies    yes             yes 




Fem*HS dropout    -0.001          -0.012 
                  (0.018)         (0.018) 
Fem*HS grad.       0.002           0.005 
                  (0.012)         (0.012) 
Fem*Some coll.     0.021           0.037 
                  (0.013)         (0.013) 
Fem*Experience    -0.000          -0.001 
                  (0.001)         (0.001) 
Fem*Married       -0.081          -0.076 
                  (0.008)         (0.008) 
Fem*Non-white      0.021           0.021 
                  (0.010)         (0.010) 
 
Exp*HS dropout    -0.015          -0.014 
                  (0.002)         (0.002) 
Exp*Hs grad       -0.007          -0.007 
                  (0.002)         (0.001)           
Exp*Some coll     -0.001          -0.001 
                  (0.002)         (0.002) 
 
NW*HS dropout      0.087           0.050 
                  (0.019)         (0.019) 
NW*HS grad         0.001          -0.006 
                  (0.014)         (0.014) 
NW*Some coll      -0.004          -0.004 
                  (0.015)         (0.015) 
NW*experience     -0.002          -0.003 
                  (0.002)         (0.002) 
Constant           1.046           1.060 
                  (0.049)         (0.049) 
R-squared          0.405           0.418 
  46Note: All models are estimated on a sample of 35,438 observations for 5,904 
workers.  The skill index is constructed by computing a predicted wage from 
equation (2) using only the variables AFQT, education (both years of education 
and education categories) and experience, and holding the other variables 
(female, married, non-white, union, year, industry and occupation) at their 
average sample values. 
  47Appendix B: Choice of instruments 
 
This appendix explains the choice of the interaction between the sector affiliation at time t-1 and t-2 as the main set 
of instruments in model with comparative advantage and learning.  The intuition for this choice is most easily 
understood using of Figure 1.  First note that in the most general model with comparative advantage and learning, 
Figure 1 remains as is except that the unmeasured ability ηi is replaced by its expected value conditional on the 
available information, mi,t-1.  Consider the case of sectors j and j-1 in the Figure 1.  There are four possible “sector 
histories” in these two sectors.  Workers can either “stay” in sector j-1 or j in both time periods, or switch (from j to 
j-1 or from j-1 to j).  Workers with expected ability close to the critical value vj-1(X) are more likely to switch sector 
than either workers with expected ability clearly lower than vj-1(X) (sector j-1 stayers) or clearly higher than vj-1(X) 
(sector j-1 stayers).  In terms of expected ability and wages, “switchers” currently in sector j-1 should earn more 
than other workers in sector j-1, while “switchers” currently in sector j should earn less than other workers in sector 
j.   
 
Appendix Tables B1 (occupations) and B2 (industries) show that the data is broadly consistent with this prediction.  
These tables show the average log wages as a function of current and previous sector affiliations.  For example, 
consider operatives and laborers as sector j-1 and craft workers as sector j.  As expected, “stayers” in the craft 
occupation earn more (0.08) than craft workers who switched from operatives and laborers to craft (-0.09).  By 
contrast, workers who “switch down” from craft to operatives and laborers earn more (-0.11) than “stayers” in the 
operative and laborers occupation (-0.17).   
 
This example shows how the interaction between sector affiliation at time t and t-1 helps predict wages even after 
controlling for the current sector affiliation.  Similar reasoning can be used to show how the interaction between 
sector affiliation at time t-1 and t-2 can be used to predict sector affiliation at time t.  Recall that like the lagged 
wage, the current sector affiliation is endogenous in the model with comparative advantage and learning.   
 
Consider, for example, the choice of sector at time t of individuals observed to be in sector j at time t-1.  Remember 
from Figure 1 that the expected ability of sector j workers (at time t-1) who were in sector j-1 at time t-2 should be 
lower (close to vj-1(X)) than the expected ability of sector j workers who were also in sector j at time t-2.  Consider a 
positive productivity signal that increases expected ability mi .  Since sector j stayers (at time t-1 and t-2) are closer 
to the upper critical value vj(X) than the switchers who just came from sector j-1, the stayers are more likely to 
move to sector j+1 at time t than the switchers.  This shows how the interaction between sector affiliation at time t-1 
and t-2 can be used to predict sector affiliation at time t.   
 
In summary, sector histories (interaction between sector dummies at time t-1 and t-2) should help predict both the 
wage at t-1 and the sector affiliation at time t in the model with comparative advantage and learning.  Appendix 
Tables B1 and B2 suggest they do so in the case of the wage.  A more formal test consists of testing the predictive 
power of the sector histories on the lagged wage and current affiliation after controlling for all other exogenous 
variables of the model.  In a linear model, this test is just the standard F-test of the predictive power of the excluded 
instruments in the first-stage equation.  Testing for the predictive power of instruments is more complicated in a 
non-linear context.  In the linear model y = xβ + e, the “first-stage” consists of projecting all the right hand side 
variables (x) on the set of instruments, where the x variables also happen to be (minus) the derivative (or gradient) 
of e with respect the parameters β (since e = y - xβ).  In the non-linear model, the equivalent of the first-stage is thus 
a regression of the gradient of e with respect to the structural parameters.  Those derivatives will typically be non-
linear combinations of various x variables.  One way to measure the predictive power of the instruments is thus to 
compute F-tests on the excluded instruments in these “gradient” regressions.   
 
The more intuitive approach we follow is to linearize the gradients as a function of the various explanatory 
variables.  Once this linearization is performed, we can simply compute the usual F-test on the “first-stage” 
equations for the lagged wage and the current sector affiliation.  To be consistent with the estimated models of 
Table 3 and Table 6, our excluded instruments are the interactions between sector affiliation at time t-1 and t-2 as 
well as interactions of sector affiliation at time t-2 with the skill index and experience.  The F-statistics are reported 
below.  In all cases, they largely exceed the critical values (at the 95 percent confident level) of 1.26 for industries 





  48F-test of the predictive power of instruments 
 
      Lagged   Current sector     # of excluded 
wage    (range of values)   instruments 
       
Occupations: 16.27   16.27-38.69    60 
 
Industries:   11.46   17.45-26.68    117 
 
As mentioned in the text and tables, in the case with comparative advantage but no learning we use the sector 
affiliations at time t and t-1 (instead of t-1 and t-2) as instruments.  In this case, the F-statistics are 10.70 and 8.27 




Having established that the instruments predict well the lagged wage and sector affiliation, it is also important to 
know whether the instruments are valid in the sense that they are uncorrelated with the error term in equation (13).  
As discussed in Section 2.4, the overidentification test is the natural way of testing this hypothesis.  In a complicated 
non-linear model like ours, however, this test is an omnibus test that can fail either because the model is 
misspecified or because the model is well-specified but the instruments are invalid.  Intuitively speaking, the model 
is overidentified when there are more instruments than parameters.  So the model may either fail the 
overidentification test because not enough parameters are included (model misspecified) or because some of the 
instruments are invalid.  In the absence of further information, we cannot conclude that the instruments are invalid 
just because our models do not generally pass the overidenfication test.     
  
For example, we use throughout the paper a convenient single-index model in which wages in all sectors are linear 
functions of the same underlying index of measured and unmeasured skills.  While this assumption is used for 
reasons of convenience and clarity, it is well-known to be restrictive in models with more than two sectors (see 
Heckman and Scheinkman, 1987).  By contrast, Lemieux (1998) argues that the single index model imposes little 
restriction when only two sectors are used.   
 
It is easy to see in the three sector case illustrated in Figure 1 why the single index model is restrictive.  Consider 
sector j-1 and j.  The relative slope and intercepts in the two sectors can be estimated using the subsample of 
workers that are in these two sectors at time t and t-1 (and t-2 in the model with learning).  Similarly, observations 
from sectors j and j+1 can be used to estimate the relative slope and intercepts in these two sectors.  Say we 
normalize the slope in sector j-1 to 1 and estimate the slope of sector j relative to j-1 to be 1.2.  If the slope in sector 
j+1 relative to j is also 1.2, it follows that the slope of sector j+1 relative to j-1 is 1.44.   
 
According to the model, it is unlikely that a worker would switch directly from sector j-1 to j+1 or vice versa.  But 
since those transitions are actually observed in the data, it is possible to use the subsample of workers in the two 
sectors in two consecutive periods to estimate the relative slope and intercepts in sectors j-1 and j+1.  To the extent 
that the resulting slope (for example) is statistically different from 1.44, the overidentification test will fail since 
different identification strategies yield different estimates of the slopes.  In this case we would conclude, however, 
that the failure of the overidentification is a consequence of the fact that the single index model is an 
oversimplication. 
 
In light of this example, we re-estimate the model of columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 using only workers who either stay 
in the same occupation at t and t-1 (66 percent of the sample) or move across adjoining occupations according to the 
ranking used in the tables (14 percent of the sample).
24  Consistent with our expectations, the p-value on the 
overidentification test moves from 0.0000 (Table 3) to 0.2776.  In other words, the overidentification restrictions 
can no longer be rejected at standard significance levels.   
                                                           
24 Note that except for clerical and service occupations, occupational mobility tends to be concentrated between 
adjoining sectors.   There is a total of 11969 occupation transitions (34 percent of all observations) in the data.  Of 
those 4789 are between “adjoining” occupation (i.e. between occupation 1 (professionals) and 2 (managers), 2 and 3 
(sales), etc.).  Of the 7180 transitions among “non-adjoining” occupations, 5316 involve either clerical or service 
occupations.  This pattern of transitions among occupations suggests that these two particular occupations are 
difficult to rank in terms of an occupational hierarchy based on a single index of skills.   
  49 
Another possible source of misspecification is that, as mentioned in Section 2, we assume throughout the paper that 
this period's wage is specified before production occurs. This, in essence, assumes away the presence of piece rate 
contracts or of any form of contracts where the level of pay is determined ex post, such as contracts where part of 
the compensation is based on a subjective evaluation of performance. One consequence of having some workers in 
our sample being paid piece rates or commissions would thus be to affect the validity of our overidentifying 
restrictions.  To explore whether this might be one reason why the restrictions are all rejected, we re-estimated our 
occupation models by first restricting the sample to workers who were in occupations in which the percentage of 
piece rate workers is below 10%. To impose this sample selection restriction, we looked at the percentage of 
workers in the sample who are paid commissions or piece rates between 1988 and 1990, the three years in which 
this information is available in the NLSY. We then exclude from our total sample observations that belong to one of 
the 3-digit occupations where piece rates account for at least 10% of the observations between 1988 and 1990.25   
As it turns out, the overidentifying restrictions are still decidedly rejected, although the p-value does increase 
somewhat to 0.0003  for the model with comparative advantage only.26  There is hardly any change for the model 
with both learning and comparative advantage. 
 
If we further restrict the sample to occupations where piece rates account for less than 5% of the sample (this 
reduces the sample size to 18,108 observations), we basically get the same results as in the previous paragraph for 
the full sample: the overidentifying restrictions are rejected in both models. For the subsample of new jobs only, 
though, both models pass the test, with a p-value of 0.2185 for the comparative advantage model and 0.0827 for the 
model. 
 
In summary, our assumptions that wages are paid in advance and depend on a single index of skill are restrictive 
and clearly contribute to the rejection of the overidentification restrictions of the model.  It would be useful to 
enrich the empirical model in future research to accommodate departures from these assumptions.  But despite the 
limitations of our approach, we think our model and instrumentation strategy are a useful way of analyzing the role 




                                                           
25This reduces the sample size from to 24,726 observations. Not surprisingly, the main deletions are made in sales-
related occupations, where we are more likely to find workers paid commissions, and also among operatives, which 
account for the bulk of piece rate workers.  A list of all deleted 3-digit occupations is available upon request. 
26The improvement is more substantial if we look at new jobs. In fact, we cannot reject the restrictions (p-
value=0.0904) for the model with comparative advantage. The restrictions are still rejected for the full model with 
learning and comparative advantage (p-value=0.0175). 
  50Appendix Table B1: Average Value of Log Wage in year t as a function of occupations in year t and t-1. 
Occupation                           First lag of Occupation Categories                                    
Categories                                   
           Professional Managers    Sales     Clerical   Craft     Operatives  Services    Total 
                                                         Workers   & laborers 
 
Professional   0.30       0.36       0.26       0.07       0.18       0.02      -0.05       0.26 
 
 
Managers       0.36       0.21       0.26       0.01       0.12      -0.16      -0.22       0.16 
 
 
Sales          0.23       0.22       0.24      -0.09      -0.20      -0.35      -0.45       0.13 
 
 
Clerical       0.05      -0.05      -0.14      -0.15      -0.10      -0.27      -0.41      -0.15 
 
 
Craft workers  0.15       0.13      -0.12      -0.12       0.08      -0.09      -0.21       0.03 
 
 
Operatives     0.01      -0.22      -0.25      -0.25      -0.11      -0.17      -0.39      -0.17 
& Laborers       
 
Services      -0.06      -0.26      -0.51      -0.45      -0.27      -0.39      -0.24      -0.26 
 workers 
 
Total          0.27       0.16       0.14      -0.13       0.03      -0.17      -0.25       0.00 
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Appendix Table B2: Average Value of Log Wage in year t as a function of industry in year t and t-1. 
                                                   First lag of Industry Categories           
 
Industry       Mining,  Non-     Constr- Transpo.  FIRE   Bus&Prof Personal Wholesale Retail   Public    All 
categories     Durables Durables uction  and util.        Services Services trade     trade    sector 
 
Mining,         0.15     0.03    -0.05     0.15    0.09     0.24    -0.10     0.05    -0.21     0.24     0.11 
 durables 
 
Non-Durables    0.01    -0.03    -0.22    -0.08    0.03     0.02    -0.22    -0.08    -0.18    -0.05    -0.05 
 
 
Construction   -0.05    -0.12     0.09     0.06   -0.01    -0.04    -0.15    -0.11    -0.18    -0.13     0.03 
 
 
Transportation, 0.17     0.08    -0.04     0.20    0.17     0.10    -0.18    -0.09    -0.19     0.10     0.14 
 Utilities 
 
Fin., Insur.,   0.02    -0.12     0.00    -0.08    0.13     0.16    -0.33    -0.08    -0.22     0.05     0.10 
 Real estate 
 
Business and    0.21     0.02    -0.11     0.03    0.16     0.25    -0.18     0.01    -0.22     0.02     0.15 
 Prof. Services 
 
Personal       -0.18    -0.41    -0.16    -0.17   -0.40    -0.26    -0.26    -0.34    -0.38    -0.01    -0.28 
 Services 
 
Wholesale       0.05    -0.12    -0.19    -0.04   -0.11    -0.04    -0.30    -0.00    -0.22     0.01    -0.03 
 trade 
 
Retail Trade   -0.29    -0.31    -0.39    -0.23   -0.33    -0.24    -0.31    -0.29    -0.23    -0.25    -0.25 
 trade 
 
Public Sector  -0.01     0.05    -0.07     0.07    0.00     0.16    -0.05    -0.01    -0.08     0.19     0.14 
 
All             0.10    -0.05     0.02     0.14    0.10     0.16    -0.25    -0.02    -0.23     0.15    -0.00 
 